



VISION 2030 JAMAICA

NATIONAL SECURITY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

SECTOR PLAN 2009 - 2030





VISION 2030 JAMAICA

NATIONAL SECURITY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

**SECTOR PLAN
2009 – 2030**

Table of Contents

Background.....	1
1.0 Introduction.....	4
Crime and Violence.....	4
Correction and Rehabilitation of Offenders	7
2.0 Situational Analysis.....	15
Crime and Crime Reduction.....	15
Corrections and Rehabilitation	31
3.0 SWOT Analysis.....	42
Vision Statements	49
Strategic Plan.....	49
5.0 Implementation Framework and Action Plan for the National Security and Correctional Services	
Sector Plan.....	52
ACTION PLAN.....	54
6.0 Monitoring & Evaluation Framework for the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan.....	71
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework.....	71
List of Acronyms.....	75
References.....	76
APPENDIX 1.....	78
List of Members for the National Security Task Force.....	78
APPENDIX 2.....	79
List of Members for the Correctional Services Task Force.....	79

Background

The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) was mandated to spearhead the design of a National Development Plan to achieve developed country status for Jamaica by 2030. The plan will also facilitate the process of transformation and modernization of the respective sectors in keeping with the attainment of Millennium Development Goals. In consequence, the PIOJ identified a number of thematic areas that should be addressed by the plan and established over 30 Task Forces to contribute to the achievement of the mandate under these thematic areas.

One of the Task Forces established was the National Security Task Force. The role of this Task Force was to comprehensively review the National Security portfolio in Jamaica and develop an appropriate plan that would include a vision, goals, objectives, strategies indicators, actions, and responsible agencies/institutions for transforming our system of National Security into a modern one that is equal to or better than the standards expected of a developed country and the country into a state that is experiencing minimal levels of crime and violence.

Another of the Task Forces established was the Correctional Services Task Force. Its role was also to comprehensively review the Correctional Services and develop an appropriate plan that would include a vision, goals, objectives, strategies indicators, and responsible agencies/institutions that would make the Correctional Services into a modern system equal to or better than the standards expected of a developed country and in keeping with the identifiable needs and focus of the Jamaican society.

Although the Correctional Services and National Security Task Forces worked separately to develop plans for their respective areas, both plans have been combined into this single document which is presented as a final draft. It incorporates Situational Analyses of National Security and the Correctional Services, SWOT analyses of both and Goals, Objectives and broad Strategies of both combined into a single matrix.

While the plans have been combined, the vision statements for National Security and the Correctional Services have been kept separate. They are respectively:

National Security:

“A system of National Security that promotes shared values of respect for law and order and guarantees safety, security, human rights and dignity for all.”

Correctional Services:

“A Highly satisfied and trained, professional workforce administering a Correctional Services system that upholds human dignity and facilitates the holistic development and rehabilitation of clients as productive, peaceful and law abiding citizens”

The Goals around which the plan has been built encapsulate several sub themes. These relate to empowerment of communities and fostering of community support for equity and the rule of law (Goal 1), strengthening respect for the law and law enforcement agents in the wider society, reducing organised and trans-national crime as well as youth involvement in gangs and criminal enterprise and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement agencies (particularly the JCF) with respect to methods of operation, acquisition and use of appropriate technology and facilities and integrity (Goal 2); improving the management of Jamaica’s borders and territorial waters (Goal 3) and strengthening the process of reintegrating and rehabilitating convicted offenders and at risk individuals in society (Goal 4).

The goals are as follows:

Goal 1: *Social cohesion within and among communities.*

Goal 2: *A society which adheres to law and order.*

Goal 3: *Protected Jamaican Borders and territory*

Goal 4: *An integrated system that manages reintegration and rehabilitation*

The plan is outlined under the following subheads:

1. Introduction
2. Situational Analysis
3. SWOT
4. Strategic Vision and Planning Framework
5. Implementation Framework and action plan
6. Monitoring and evaluation framework

List of Acronyms

References

Appendices – List of Task Force members

Introduction

Crime and Violence

Crime is not unique to Jamaica it occurs worldwide. In 2006, the USA had an overall crime rate of 3 808 per 100 000, Canada recorded 7 518 Criminal Code incidents per 100 000 while Jamaica had an overall crime rate of 1,074 per 100 000. The rate rose to 1,244 in 2007.

Based on the figures presented, the assumption could be made that Jamaica is generally a much safer community when compared to these countries. However, when one considers the murder rates for these countries a completely different picture is painted. The 2006 murder rate for the USA was 5.7 per 100 000, Canada's murder rate was 1.85 per 100 000 while, Jamaica recorded 50 murders per 100 000 persons.

The rate rose to 60 per 100 000 in 2008 (despite fluctuations in the intervening years). As it relates to murder rates (2005 figures) for other Caribbean countries, the Dominican Republic had a murder rate of 26.7 per 100,000, Trinidad and Tobago 35.7

per 100,000, Haiti 11.5 per 100 000 and El Salvador is 55.5 per 100,000, twice the average for Latin America. In 2006, Honduras had a murder rate of 40.6 per 100 000 and Guatemala had a rate of 37.5 per 100 000.¹ These figures serve to further highlight a problem being faced by not only Jamaica but several other countries in the region.

While the overall crime rate for Jamaica is low, the high murder rate has implications for the safety and security of the country's residents and visitors and its growth and development. Therefore, the major task of the Government of Jamaica, the security forces and the entire populous is to reduce the murder rate to more acceptable levels.

The impact of crime and violence varies across societies. Whatever the degree of impact however, there is no doubt that

¹ Haiti: Economic Growth and Violence by Carlo Dade January/February 2007, Volume 6, Number 1 <http://www.focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/fp0107/?article=article1&lang=e>

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

crime has a negative impact on everyone. As earlier noted, the problem in the Caribbean and Jamaica in particular is the level of violent crimes that are being committed.

At present, Jamaica is ranked among the top three countries in the world with the highest murder rate annually. Violence is high in Jamaica, especially in poor urban neighbourhoods, where many forms of violence--interpersonal, domestic, gang, political, drug--are ever present in daily life.² In trying to identify the root cause of crime and violence in Jamaica, unemployment is perennially identified in population sample surveys as one of the major social issues to be confronted in Jamaica.

According to information from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *“Crime and violence remain high, with Jamaica having the third highest murder rate in the world as well as significant amounts of domestic violence.*

These high levels of crime and violence erode the social fabric, chip away at the concept of rule of law, and weaken the very foundation of the bond between a government and its citizens. Further, high crime and violence lead to exorbitant financial costs that divert otherwise productive resources into increased security measures, and for managing in the aftermath of criminal acts. Moreover, crime and violence are symptoms of much more fundamental social ills such as weakened family structures, poor education, high unemployment, failed justice systems that are unable to bring redress in a timely manner, and political tribalism.”³

The prevalence of violent crimes in Jamaica has had a deleterious effect on the level of growth and development in the country. The National Security Policy for Jamaica notes that, “National security issues greatly affect the nation’s chances of achieving its social and economic goals, including ensuring human security for its people.

These issues also have local, regional and international dimensions.” This is because “Jamaica competes in a global economy

² Jamaica Violence and Urban Poverty in Jamaica: Breaking the Cycle

³ <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/lac/jm.html>

that demands that our goods and services be internationally competitive.” The control of crime and violence in particular should therefore be seen as central to any development plan for Jamaica.

There are a number of strategies that have been developed and implemented world wide to reduce crime rates. Some experts⁴ have suggested that “*Regional security and police officials should adopt a ‘problem-solving, rather than a ‘reactive approach’ to policing and crime management’*”. They have further recommended that “*Problem-solving approaches to policing include strategies that embrace community policing, identification of and focusing resources on ‘hot spots’ of crime, removing the underlying causes of high crime rate, and ‘democratic policing’*.”⁵

Some key approaches that have been implemented to reduce crime include:

I. Community Policing Initiatives⁶ –

⁴ Recommendations from the Crime and Violence in Conference, UWI Mona, October 29 – 30, 2007, <http://www.mona.uwi.edu/proffice/newsroom2.asp?autonumber=208>

⁵ Recommendations from the Crime and Violence in Conference, UWI Mona, October 29 – 30, 2007, <http://www.mona.uwi.edu/proffice/newsroom2.asp?autonumber=208>

⁶ Do Community Oriented Policing Services Grants Affect Violent Crime Rates? by David B. Muhlhausen, Center for Data

Community policing initiatives achieves its goal of reducing crimes rates by have security personnel and residents work together “*to solve problems associated with crime, social and physical disorder, undesirable neighborhood conditions, and fear of crime*”.

The direct consequences of violent crime are apparent, but the relationship between the fear caused by crime and social disorder is less well understood. The role of community police officers is not simply to make arrests, but also to prevent crime, work with the community to solve ongoing problems, and improve the quality of life in communities.

Community policing is built around three approaches. These are:

- a. Diagnosing and managing problems in the community that produce serious crimes;*

Analysis Report #01-05, March 25, 2001. Available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/CDA01-05.cfm>

- b. **Fostering** closer relationships with residents of the community to facilitate crime solving; and
- c. **Building** self-defense capabilities within the community itself.

II. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) –

principles originally developed in the 1970's by C Ray Jeffery a criminologist from Florida State University. *Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is aimed at "identifying conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts . . . and the alteration of those conditions so that no crimes occur . . ."* (Brantingham and Faust, 1976: 289, 290, 292).

Since it is aimed at preventing occurrences of criminality, CPTED is conceptually distinct and significantly different from the reactive (and largely failing) strategies employed by police, courts, and correctional facilities in

the American criminal justice system (Wallis, 1980).⁷ Presently CPTED Principles is concerned with using physical design features to create safe environments and deter criminal activity. There are countries that have included CPTED principles as a part of the regulations for physical development projects and a way of mainstreaming the concept.

For this plan the Task Force was careful to consider the relevance and relative success of varying approaches to crime while paying special attention to the unique variables driving violent crimes in Jamaica.

Correction and Rehabilitation of Offenders

Correction and rehabilitation are essential to the enforcement of the law and the maintenance of a law abiding society. One of the universal methods of correcting and rehabilitating serious offenders against the law is imprisonment.

⁷ The Theoretical Development of 'CPTED': 25 Years of Responses to C. Ray Jeffery Matthew B. Robinson, In: *Advances In Criminological Theory*, Vol. 8 Eds By William Laufer And Freda Adler, <http://www.acs.appstate.edu/dept/ps-cj/vitacpted2.html>

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

Prisons have the responsibility to receive as many people as the courts may commit to them, to hold them securely and release them back into the community on the due date established by the courts⁸.

The world prison population was estimated to be over 9.25 million people (includes remand and sentenced offenders) at the end of October 2006. Of this number, approximately 50 per cent were being held in prisons in the United States (2.19 m - June 5, 05), China (1.55m – does not include remand prisoners, Dec. 03) and Russia (0.87m, Oct. 1, 06).⁹

The report notes that the prison population rate per 100 000 for the US is 738 (June 30, 05), 371 for the UK (Oct. 27, 06), 107 for Canada (March 31, 04), 367 for Barbados (March 05), 296 for Trinidad and Tobago (May 1, 05) and 182 for Jamaica (June 06). This fell to approximately 137 in 2008.

Overcrowding in prisons is a major concern internationally. The prisons in the US and

UK are operating at just over 100% and currently the US federal prison system is 33 per cent overcrowded while State systems in the US are up to 17 per cent overcrowded.¹⁰ Additionally, the prisons in Cameroon and Thailand are operating at capacities of over 200% and, the only prison in Barbados, Glendairy Prison, is 302 % occupied. According to 2008 figures for Jamaica¹¹ the prison system was operating at 27% above capacity.

Article ten of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹² which states, “**All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person**” should provide the guidelines for treating with prisoners. Therefore, in addition to detaining prisoners, prisons have the task of providing a regime which aids a prisoner’s resettlement and reduces the likelihood of further involvement in

⁸ “The Restorative Prison Project”, Anne Mace, November 2000

⁹ “World Prison Population List”, International Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College London, Roy Walmsley,

¹⁰ “Dealing with prison overcrowding” ,Guidance Note 4 International Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College London, 2004

¹¹ Economic and Social Survey Jamaica, 2006

¹² *ibid*

crime¹³.

The following excerpt from “Correctional Best Practices” compiled by the Association of Correctional Administrators in the United States of America¹⁴ provides context to the administration of Correctional Services globally.

It states that:

The development of fair, objective and manageable offender classification systems closely parallels the evolution of the nation’s (USA) correctional philosophy. In the early 1800s, correction focused on retribution and punishment and classification was based primarily on offence type. Offenders were grouped for the purpose of determining the “appropriate” punishment and were housed in comparable settings and occupied their time in a similar manner.

In the latter part of the 19th century, there was a shift towards reform and rehabilitation. By virtue of their arrest and conviction, offenders were deemed deficient in many areas, including

personal growth and survival skills. The task of classification during this period was to identify existing deficiencies and take corrective action (the “medical” model). This trend lost favour due to public frustration with rising crime rates, gratuitous violence and the perceived failure of treatment programs.”

Today, correctional philosophy in many, if not most jurisdictions, is increasingly based on a retributive/punishment or “just desserts” view of handling offenders. Previous assumptions regarding the effectiveness of “rehabilitation” have been increasingly challenged.

Notwithstanding these challenges to the notion that rehabilitation should be the focus of Corrections, in jurisdictions such as Canada, which is regarded as one of the benchmarks in the area of Corrections, rehabilitation remains the major objective. Rehabilitation (also referred to as Client Rehabilitation) is defined as, “A process of empowering those who have been placed into the care of the Department of Correctional Services so that they can become law-abiding productive members of society.”¹⁵

¹³ Prison Service Statement in HM Prison Service Annual report and Accounts April 1998 to March 1999, available online at <http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/>

¹⁴ “Correctional Best Practices”, Association of Correctional Administrators, Edited by Reynold A. Wilkinson

¹⁵ “A National Rehabilitation Strategy”, Prepared by Planning Concepts, 2001

There are numerous definitions for rehabilitation. However, they all tend to agree on the following issues¹⁶:

1. The intervention is planned or explicitly undertaken, not a chance or unwitting occurrence;
2. The intervention targets for change some aspect about the offender that is thought to cause the offender's criminality, such as his or her attitudes, cognitive processes, personality or mental health, social relationships to others, educational and vocational skills, and employment
3. The intervention is intended to make the offender less likely to break the law in the future—that is, it reduces “recidivism.”

It should be noted that rehabilitation does *not* include interventions that seek to repress criminal involvement through specific deterrence—that is, use punishment to make offenders too fearful of sanctions to recidivate. In recent times, the concept of “Restorative Justice” has also come under

consideration as an approach to Corrections.

Restorative justice involves ensuring that the offender takes responsibility for the crime and takes action to address the harm caused to the victim and the community.¹⁷

The US has had some success in the process of rehabilitation for offenders and some correctional services programmes¹⁸ that have been successful in the US include the following:

1. **Colorado's Youthful Offender System, Colorado Department of Corrections** – The program's intent is to divert young offenders who have been charged as adults with violent and weapons involved crimes. It offers them a program that lies between the juvenile system and prison. The hope is that it will return them to society changed for the better.

Much of the effort, which lasts two to six years, always with the threat

¹⁶ “Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects”, Criminal Justice 2000, Vol. 3 pg. 109 – 175, Francis T. Cullen and Paul Gendreau

¹⁷ “Correctional Best Practices”, Association of State Correctional Administrators, Middletown, CT, August 2000

¹⁸ “Correctional Best Practices”, Association of State Correctional Administrators, Middletown, CT, August 2000

of adult prison in the background, is specifically aimed at substituting accepted norms for gang behaviour. Under this programme the recidivism rate among youth offenders moved from 26.3% in the 1996/1997 fiscal year, to 6.1% in the 1998/1999 fiscal year.

2. **Non-Secure Drug Treatment Program (NSDT), Florida Department of Corrections** - An offender is put on probation or community control and is ordered by the circuit court to participate in the NSDT program. His or her offense (the program is co-ed for counselling and treatment only) is

program is divided into two parts: intensive drug and/or alcohol treatment (first two months) and employment/re-entry (last four months).

3. **Correctional Recovery Academy, Indiana Department of Corrections** - The Correctional Recovery Academy utilizes a cognitive-behavioural approach which focuses on the thinking systems that underline the offenders' criminal and drug related behaviour. The approach in the academy is holistic, with a strong emphasis on teaching the offender skills directed toward

Program Results by Recommitment Status (1991-1999)

Program Results	Prison	Supervision	No Recommitment	Total
Success	1,725 (17.0%)	1,978 (19.5%)	6,402 (63.3%)	10,105
Failure	2,442 (32.7%)	1,973 (26.4%)	3,051 (40.8%)	7,466
Other	333 (24.1%)	300 (21.7%)	744 (54.0%)	1,377
Total	4,500 (23.7%)	4,251 (22.4%)	10,197 (53.8%)	18,948

generally drug related. The top five offences for those admitted to NSDT in 1999 were drug possession, drug sale, purchase or manufacture, grand theft, burglary of a structure and stolen property, in that order. The six-month

the following:

- a. Avoiding further substance abuse and criminal behaviour
- b. Anger management
- c. Interpersonal skills training
- d. Twelve step fellowship

-
- e. Problem solving
 - f. Relapse prevention
 - g. Intensive continuing recovery care planning
 - h. Peer counselling
 - i. Spirituality

4. **Mental Health Treatment Unit, Indiana Department of Corrections** – The unit is a retrofitted standard housing unit, with single person cells and televisions provided for all offenders upon arrival.

Requirements for placement on the unit consist primarily of a diagnosis of serious and persistent mental illness, adequate intellectual functioning to enable participation in programming, a willingness to participate in programming and a need for maximum-security confinement.

The unit officially opened in July 1998. Since that time, 58 offenders have been placed on the unit; 40 continue treatment, ten have been removed due to inability to adjust to the treatment milieu, and eight have

been released having completed their sentences. The project received the Indiana Correctional Association's Program of the Year award.

5. **Objective Classification System, Delaware Department of Correction** - Offenders are grouped for the purpose of determining the "appropriate" punishment and are housed in comparable settings and occupy their time in a similar manner. Structured decision-making allows for:

- a. Better planning of resources, i.e., staff size, number and types of replacement beds and other services to address needs;
- b. More efficient use of resources - the most violent offenders are quickly identified and handled accordingly while low and moderate risk offenders are not over supervised, leading to wasted resources; and
- c. Typically, information gathered and decisions made through this process are

better received by courts and legislators due to the high rate of reliability

6. A Holistic Approach to Female Offenders, Rhode Island

Department of Corrections – The Rhode Island DOC has developed a program with three long-term goals:

- a. To create an institutional environment that is safe, humane and conducive to treatment.
- b. To ensure that services and programming are gender specific, sensitive to all areas of concern to women offenders and thoroughly integrated with each other.
- c. To build essential ties to community groups that will become aware of the needs of female offenders and develop strategies to meet these needs. The services will begin in the institutions and will continue upon release.

7. Security Threat Group

Management Unit, New Jersey Department of Corrections - The Security Threat Group Management Unit (STGMU), located at Northern State Prison has been designed to isolate problematic, gang affiliated inmates or those identified as gang leaders from the general population.

At the same time, the STGMU provides a structured and controlled environment where inmate behaviour is closely monitored by a team of departmental staff. The unit employs a three-phase Behaviour Modification Program.

To complete the program, inmates are required to successfully participate in substantive and relevant programs that deal with areas such as alternatives to violent behaviour, cognitive thinking and non-violent living.

The goal is to give inmates insight and teach them the skills necessary to interact appropriately without the perceived need of gang membership. It also forces inmates to deal with

the consequences of their actions. Prior to moving through the program, inmates are required to sign an "Acknowledgement of Expectations" for each phase that clearly outlines their responsibilities for successful program completion.

Due to its focus on rehabilitation, the Jamaican Department of Correctional Services (DCS) has benchmarked the Canadian system as the standard for the development of its own system. In this regard, a Needs Assessment done by a group of Consultants from the Canadian Department of Corrections resulted in the submission of 27 recommendations geared towards revamping of the local Correctional System.

The recommendations¹⁹ have been presented in eight strategic groups namely:

1. Client Information Management Strategies: Assessment, Classification and Programming
2. Client Aftercare Strategies
3. Client Welfare Strategies
4. Educational, Training and Development Strategies

5. Human Services Strategies (Medical, Psychological, Psychiatric and Dental Services)
6. Client Recreational Strategies
7. Strategic Alliances
8. Strategies for defining the Role of Stakeholder

Since then, the local Department of Correctional Services (DCS) has embarked on a programme of reform that includes the refocusing of the department to centre more on rehabilitation (See Text Box).

The DCS website states that: “The philosophical and conceptual functions of the Department were revisited and restructured to reflect a 21st century approach to the correctional process. This paradigm shift is reflected in newly outlined Mission and Vision Statements and (a) Correctional Process which solidified the focus and function of the Department towards the idea of a National Rehabilitation Strategy which would concentrate on the empowerment of its clients (inmates/wards).”

¹⁹ “A National Rehabilitation Strategy”, Prepared by Planning Concepts, 2001

Situational Analysis

Crime and Violence

According to JCF statistics of reported crimes, the overall crime rate in Jamaica declined significantly for the period 1996 – 2006. The crime rate in 1996 was 2,256 offences per 100,000 of the population. By 2001 this rate had declined to 1,286 and 1,069 in 2006. Figures 1 and 2 below present a graphical view of the changes in overall crime, violent crime²⁰ and property crime since 1996.

Figure 1 shows that the overall crime rate in Jamaica²¹ reached its lowest point in 2006.


Further examination of the statistics also

²⁰ This includes murder, shooting, carnal abuse, robbery, rape and burglary and breaking.

²¹ Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008

reveals that there was a steady decline in overall crime rate from 1,996 to 2002 by over 50%.


However, a moderate increase in 2003 continued into 2004 when the overall crime rate peaked at 1,353 per 100,000 persons. There was also a 29% increase in major crimes between 2003 and 2004.



The most significant change in the period was a 51% increase in the number of murders. By 2005, crime had again started to move downwards and this decline continued into 2006 when the crime rate fell to 1,069, representing a 15% decline over

the previous year. In 2007, however, the rate rose to 1,244.

of shootings increased by 44.19% while, the murder rate increased by 70.27%. In 2005,




Violent Crimes including murders and shootings

As mentioned previously, the following are regarded as violent crimes: rape, robbery, murder, shooting, carnal abuse and burglary and breaking. Figure 3 below illustrates changes in the rates of each category of violent crime.

Based on information presented in Figure 3, it can be seen that the murder and shooting rates for Jamaica have been fluctuating over the years. However, there was marked increase in the levels in the period between 2003 and 2005. During this period, the rate

the murder rate peaked at 63 per 100, 000 population. The rate for 2006 fell to 50 per 100 000 but by 2008, it had again risen to 60 per 100,000. Similarly, high rates of shooting were recorded for 2004 (63 per 100,000 persons) and 2005 (61 per 100,000 persons). However, this decreased to 50 per 100 000 in 2006 but climbed to approximately 57 per 100,000 in 2008. Rape appeared constant over the period with an average of 1,271 reported rapes per annum between 1997 and 2006. In 2008, the number of rapes reported was 849.



The National Crime and Victimization Study (NCVS) completed in 2006 revealed that almost two-thirds of respondents were victims of crime at some point in their lives. Furthermore, 24% said that they had experienced a crime in the last 12 months. Overall these results indicate a high prevalence of criminal victimisation in Jamaica, and confirm the official reported statistics which shows that offences against the person is 3.9 times above offences against property.

Additionally, 64% of those surveyed said that they were worried about being the victim of an armed robbery. Similarly, 61% said that they were worried about being

attacked by a stranger in public. The results showed that the majority of respondents felt safe primarily in their homes and communities. Approximately 50% of the respondents said that they felt most unsafe when using public transportation, or, out at night for work or entertainment. The study also showed that the fear of crime was greatest among females and younger people.

Property crimes

Property crime that entails robbery, larceny and breakings is another category of crime that must be taken into consideration. Table 1 shows that in 1996 the property crime rate was 439 per 100 000. Six years later in

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

2002, the rate was 154 per 100,000. This decline continued into 2006 when total property crime rate was 128 per 100,000. However, since 2007, the number has been trending upwards. While complete comparable data was not available for the 2008 period, indications from the JCF are that property crimes began to show significant increases in 2008.

Table 1: Property Crime Rates per 100,000 of the Population 1996 - 2006

While the number of larceny incidents began falling in the early 1990's and this trend continued into 2006 when the incidence fell to 211 incidents, in 2007 it rose to 304 and continued to 325 in 2008. The trends have been similar with respect to Breakings and Robbery.

There was a general decline in the number of Breakings over the period 1996 – 2006 (except in 2004, when the rate increased by

Year	Robbery Rate	Breaking Rate	Larceny Rate	Property Crime Rate	Total Property Crimes
1996	178	230	31	439	11068
1997	136	176	26	338	8614
1998	116	135	21	272	6993
1999	93	99	14	205	5296
2000	90	93	11	194	5031
2001	81	84	9	173	4521
2002	77	67	10	154	4041
2003	65	53	10	128	3369
2004	79	77	9	166	4389
2005	83	62	7	152	4033
2006	75	48	4	128	3410

Data adapted from JCF Police Statistics Department

45.28% over the previous year). The rate fell from 230 per 100,000 in 1996 to 48 per 100,000 in 2006. In 2007, the rate rose to 54 and in 2008 it almost doubled to 91 per 100,000. With respect to robbery, despite fluctuations over the period, the rate of reported robberies fell by 45% between 1997 and 2006 (from 136 per 100,000 to 75 per 100,000). However, in 2007, it more than doubled to 212 per 100,000 and increased further to 270 per 100,000 in 2008.

Other concerns

There are other concerns for the criminal justice system in Jamaica.

These include:

- I. **Drug-related crimes** – Only 2.0% of all murders in 2006 were drug-related. However, the impact of the drug trade on crime in Jamaica cannot be underestimated. In 2006, 37 196.7 kg of Marijuana was seized by the Security forces. This is in addition to 109.1 kg of Cocaine, 2.6 kg of Crack, 122.3 kg of Hash Oil, 6 kg of Hashish and 500 Ecstasy tablets.

The total number of persons arrested in 2006 for breaches of the

Dangerous Drugs Act was 6,793 and this represented a 33.85% and 9.3% increase over the same period in 2002 and 2005 respectively. Of total number of persons arrested in 2006, 94.83% were Jamaican nationals. This is consistent with figures for 2002, where 94.21% of those arrested were Jamaicans.

- II. **Justice Issues** – While plans are currently being implemented to reform the Justice sector, the present situation is undesirable. There is a severe backlog of cases in the Court of Appeal and Supreme and Resident Magistrates' Courts. In 2006, 1,185,722 cases were heard in the Resident Magistrates' Court; of this number, 624,256 cases brought forward while 561,466 were new cases. However, of this number only 464 252 were disposed of leaving 721,470 (60.85%) in arrears.

In the Supreme Court, 1,638 cases were filed while only 561(34.25%) were disposed of. As for the Court of Appeal, 914 cases were brought forward, 407 new case filed while only 417 were disposed of. This left

a total of 899 cases pending as at December 2006. By 2008, the number pending had risen to 1,069 cases.

III. State of the country's

Correctional Services – In 2008, the country's adult correctional institutions operating at 27% above capacity. There are a number of issues impacting on the ability of the correctional services to effectively undertake its duties. These include, inadequate facilities/infrastructure, inadequate programmes for inmates and high recidivism. There are plans by the Department of Correctional Services to implement a new method of corrections. Further details are provided below in the section on the Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCS).

IV. **Impact of Politics** – There exists a perceived link between politics and crime especially in areas referred to as 'Garrison' communities²². *There has been some convergence on the*

*part of the major political parties, but the legacy of the period of sharp ideological differences still lingers among party loyalists. Enclaves of dominant one-party loyalty remain, although internal cohesion has weakened significantly, leading to fragmented communities with informal power centres that are in frequent conflict and are not accountable to traditional authority.*²³

V. **Other crimes** – In addition, to major (violent) and property crimes other illegal acts that have impacted on the crime rate in Jamaica include domestic violence, fraud, arson and breaches of the Firearm Act. There were 7,450 reported cases of domestic violence in Jamaica in 2006. While there was a 20.47% decrease over figures for 2005, there was increase in the number of domestic related murders (24.49%) and rape/carnal abuse cases (4.58%). The reductions were in the number of assault (26.75%) and wounding cases (21.23%). There

²² Garrison Communities are political enclaves that largely support a major political party and where state authority is generally undermined. (Source: National Security Policy for Jamaica, GOJ, 2006)

²³ National Security Policy for Jamaica, Page 5 Section 1.12, Government of Jamaica, 2006.

has also been a reduction in the number of reported cases of fraud (20.94%), arson (5.45%) and breaches of the Firearm Act (2.36%) in 2006. The reduction in incidences of other crimes has resulted significantly in the reduction in the overall crime rate identified in (Figure 1, page 9).

3. The Use of Guns and Increase in Murders

The major public concern relating to law and order is the relatively high level of violent crimes and murder. In 2005, Jamaica recorded its highest number of murders in modern history, 1,674 (the number of murders for 2008 was 1,618).

The magnitude of the problem is of major concern. This is because of the link between the increase in the use of guns and the increase in murders. In 1996, guns were used in 67.6% of all murders. This figure increased slightly to 68.7% in 2002. However, by 2006 guns were used in 75.2% of all murders. In 2008 the proportion had risen to 77.4%.

Despite the increase in gun-related murders,

there has been a net decrease in the number of illegal firearms recovered by the Jamaica Constabulary Force between 2005 and 2008; from 692 to 613.

Seventy per cent (70%) of the murders reported in 2005 were in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), this appears to be a general pattern across the years, where the vast majority of murders are reported in the Metro areas. In 2006, murders in St Andrew South, St Catherine North and St Catherine South accounted for 55% of the total murders reported in KMA. The data also show that fluctuations in reported murders in Kingston Western and St Andrew Central are mainly responsible for the high outturn in KMA.

In rural parishes, St James and Clarendon account for nearly half of all murders committed in rural areas. For example, in 2006, of 509 murders in all rural parishes, 178 and 93 were reported in St James and Clarendon respectively. This pattern has continued into 2008 with 58% of the murders committed in the KMA areas and St. Catherine. With the exception of St. James (13%) and Clarendon (10%), all other parishes reported murder rates of 3% or less.

In 2006 gang related murder motives accounted for 33% of all murders reported islandwide. By 2008, this rate had risen to 45.5%. In 2006, Seventy five per cent of murders were reported in KMA, specifically, St Andrew South, St Catherine North, Kingston Eastern and Western. Among the rural parishes, St James had the highest number of gang related murders, accounting for 56% of the total.

4. Youth, Communities and Gangs

The increase in gang related murders in communities represents a troubling trend especially in relation to security in the communities mentioned. In addition the number of young people implicated in these crimes appears to be increasing year on year. The statistics show that young people are equally victims and perpetrators in this scenario.

Twenty-three per cent (23%) of victims and perpetrators of major crimes were in the 15 – 24 age group. There also is marked disparity between the sexes as relates to the perpetrators of major crimes.

The percentage of male youth involved in major crimes averages over 97% year on

year (97.71% in 2002 and 99.47% in 2006, 98.4 per cent in 2008). The types of major crimes perpetrated by female are murders (32%) of female offenders) and breakings (42%).

There is a tendency to focus on young people as perpetrators of crime, without a commensurate look at the ways in which they are victims of violence or the relationship between victimisation as a child and criminality in later years. As such much of the existing strategies to deal with youth crime tend to emphasise punitive measures rather than therapeutic or restorative approaches. Incarceration rates for young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years old have increased by more than 100% in the past ten years, confirming a growing trend of youth involvement in criminal activities especially, drug offences and breaches of the firearm act.

The association between gang-related activities, communities and young people, suggest that some communities are fertile ground for gangs to develop and expand.

The existence of ‘garrison communities’ as a phenomenon that describes violent social relations in some urban neighbourhoods,

largely explains how some young people become enmeshed in practices of criminality.

These communities are characterised not only by dysfunctional social relations, the physical environment is often marked by severe degradation - derelict buildings, inadequate electricity and water supply, squalid housing, and infrequent garbage disposal services. This leads to further crime in these areas, as the dilapidated conditions act as both cover and encouragement for criminal efforts.

Everyday life in these communities is imbued with fear of gang violence and antagonistic relations with the police. Moreover, the conflation between political allegiance and drug gangs have provided opportunities for the emergence of 'informal community leadership' or 'Dons' that control resource allocation, entry and exit and even 'justice' in these areas.

The virtual autonomy of 'Don' leadership therefore allows these communities to act outside of and with disregard for the state's authority. Interestingly, the perpetual underdevelopment seen in these areas is directly related to these factors, especially

as they lead to the flight of legitimate businesses.

The level of gang activity in communities especially among young men may then be explained by a confluence of factors at play in urban (inner city) neighbourhoods. For instance, the presence of a large supply of unemployed (and unemployable) young men, socially excluded from the mainstream and established in corner crews enables recruitment into organised criminal gang activity.

Although most corner gangs²⁴ are believed to be loosely organised, it is felt that they are more violent than larger organised groups. The links between these gangs and the transnational drug trade further entrenches violent crimes in some communities as different groups struggle for territory and profits. The expansion of these groups is also seen in the growth of extortion arrangements, money laundering, the proliferation of guns and fraud.

Disputes arising from 'deals gone bad' or

²⁴ It is important to point out here that research in communities has shown that not all corner crews are involved in criminal activity. Gayle, H (2007) 'Forced Ripe'.

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

allegations of disrespect are often the source of surges in gang warfare. The critical factor here is the availability and access to guns through organised criminal networks as the means of protecting ‘turf’ and maintaining respect. For example, in 2006, 57% of 17 – 25 years old in correctional facilities were incarcerated for breaches of the firearm act.

The rise of violent murders and shootings (including drive-by shootings) is a manifestation of the extent to which a ‘culture of violence’ is developing as a way of dealing with disputes. Consequently, several urban communities are marred by retaliation and reprisal that often occurs in the crossfire between various gang elements. This instils a sense of fear in residents and undermines community cohesion as well as community relations with the police.

Unstable family arrangements and economic stability play a part in generating the sense of disenfranchisement many young people experience and their emerging involvement in gang related activities. In addition, exposure to violence is noted as helping to facilitate the emerging ‘culture of violence’ in communities. Data

from the Jamaican Youth Risk and Resiliency Behaviour survey (2005) shows that 48% of respondents said that they were directly exposed to violent deaths.

Young people are also known to be susceptible to aggressive police tactics. In some urban communities some young people see the presence of the police as an invasion. Both young people and the police view each other as ‘the enemy’, and little support is provided on either side. Further, interaction between the police and young people is often based on complaints of disrespect and abuse.

Strategies have been developed to help combat this divide between youths and the security forces. These include: The Community Security Initiative (CSI) and Community Policy Model²⁵. The CSI is aimed at promoting social intervention in selected volatile communities. This includes providing counselling and mediation services, training in a variety of skill and personal development areas and improvement in physical infrastructure.

The Community Policing Model has been

²⁵ ESSJ, Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2006

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

in operation in the St. Andrew community of Grants Pen since 2003 and since its inception there have been no reported cases of major crimes in the community. A number of businesses have reopened and new ones started in the community as a result of this initiative. This is because there is increased police presence in the area and a harmonious relationship based on respect and trust has developed between residents and the police.

5. Administration and Law Enforcement

Three departments of the Ministry of National Security oversee the security of the country. These are: the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and the Department of Correctional Services (DCS).

The JDF is required to protect the country from external threats and threats against the state. It also performs air and rescue operations, emergency infrastructure development projects and gives support to the JCF in situations of intense violence and civil disturbances. The JCF is mandated to maintain law and order and protect the citizens of the country and their property from criminals. The Island Special

Constabulary Force (ISCF) gives support to the JCF primarily in traffic management and municipal policing. They also give support as court orderlies, in the prevention and control of public disorder, security of government departments and agencies, VIP residencies and judges and in the enforcement of environmental laws and praedial larceny matters. The Department of Correctional Services is responsible for the custodial care and supervision of convicted offenders and for rehabilitation of these persons. To this end, they are responsible for the maintenance and operations of the penal institutions across the country.

Budgetary allocations to the Ministry of National Security amounted to \$17.3 billion (5.0% of the National Budget) in 2005. Of this amount just over 58% was allocated to the JCF, 14% to the DCS and 2.3% to the JDF. In 2008, the allocation increased to \$36.8 billion. Fifty seven point four per cent (57.4%) went to the JCF, 11.3% to the JDF and 9.2% to the DCS.

At the end of the calendar year 2008, there were 8,223 men and women in service to the JCF, 10 below the previous year and 17.8% below the establishment size. This has resulted in a police to citizenry ratio of

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

1:327 instead of the required ratio of 1:223. The strength of the ISCF was 82.1% (1,717) of the approved establishment of 2,091. The combined strength of the JCF and ISCF at the end of 2008 was 9,940. The decline in the size of the JCF was mainly due to retirement and resignation.

The JCF and ISCF are both operating below capacity and their efficiency is further hampered by annual losses of its members. This attrition is due to retirement, resignation and deaths. In 2006, the JCF lost 261 members; 47.1% - retirement, 40.2% - resignation and 8.0% death. The ISCF lost 55 members; 60% - retirement, 23.64% - resignation, 9.09% - deaths and 7.27% - dismissal. Other factors impacting of the efficiency of the security forces include: lack of necessary equipment, poor physical infrastructure of Police Stations and outdated legislation with sanctions that do not deter potential offenders.

Senior Personnel in the JCF have indicated that the attrition rate in the JCF now averages 311 per year while the JCF training college is only able to train 358 per year. Thus it is estimated that the net intake per year averages 50. Assuming that all things remain constant, it would require

close to twenty years to fill the establishment.

Responses from the police to the violence in some communities often involve attempts to suppress criminal activities, increase visibility in local areas or remove known offenders. These approaches often increase conflict between police and communities as residents see the tactics of police as brutal, overly aggressive and imposing another layer of violence. Resulting confrontation and clashes between residents and the police then makes establishing viable crime prevention programs difficult.

Interestingly, the results from the NCVS (2006) show that on average two-thirds of the respondents felt that the police were doing a good job enforcing the law, being approachable and easy to talk to and ensuring the safety of people in their community. However, nearly half of the respondents felt that response to calls for service was not prompt and that the police was doing a poor job supplying information on ways to reduce crime.

In addition, the majority of respondents felt that there were gender, class and age biases in the way the police personnel respond to

the needs of citizens. For example, 79 per cent believed that wealthy people were treated better than poor people. These perceptions are then helpful in explaining how conflict develops between disadvantaged communities, urban youth and the police.

The National Security Policy states that, *“Abusive behaviour and the use of excessive force by members of the police and the military have not aided the efforts at building respect for law and order. These actions have contributed to a growing sense of alienation among some persons in the society who feel they are being denied justice. The sense of alienation manifests itself through illegal roadblocks as well as open displays of disrespect and distrust in the constituted authority. As a result, parallel systems of ‘justice’ have evolved with the assent of the “dons” and informal “area leaders”, as well as vigilante justice and arbitrary community enforcement.*²⁶

Generally, moves within law enforcement to suppress crime and violence in some communities have produced little results. In

addition, there has been a tendency for reductions in crime to quickly evaporate. This is evidenced in the rise in the violent crime rates.

This suggests that there is a lack of correspondence between the problem, that is, serious violent crimes and the law enforcement response. For the most part, much of the response by law enforcement appears to be conceived in isolation of available resources to effectively deal with the root of the problem and the needs of the communities. For example, the presence of multiple gangs in some urban communities requires a multi-agency approach to facilitate exit from gang membership, secure witness protection, suitably trained officers, and training and job opportunities for young men. Moreover, as suggested above the cycle of violence now being experienced in communities is also generated from dysfunctional social relations and a degraded physical environment.

This means that singular, Para-military approaches that target gang or criminal behaviour are unlikely to yield positive

²⁶ National Security Policy for Jamaica, Page 9 Section 2.9, Government of Jamaica, 2006

outcomes and impact the communities.

6. Gender and Children Issues


As earlier indicated, by far, the largest percentage of individuals charged with the commission of major crimes over time, has been males. As may be seen in Figure 4, over the five year period 2002 to 2006, the percentage of males charged with crimes compared with females has consistently been in the region of 98%. The ratio in 2008 has remained the same. This is a phenomenon that is not unique to Jamaica but seems somewhat accentuated here.

burglary. For males the corresponding crimes were shooting and murder.

It should be noted that more than 23% of all major crimes was committed by persons in the 12 – 15 age group.

As relates to victims of crime, males were also the main victims but with a much lower percentile difference between themselves and the females (71% males to 29% females over the period 2002 to 2004 and 62.5% males and 37.5% females in 2006). In 2006, the highest percentage of

Figure 4: Persons Charged with Major Crimes by Age and Sex 2002 -2006 (%)



When disaggregated by each category of major crime, the crimes for which the highest percentage of females was charged over the five year period were murder and

male victims was in the categories of murder, shooting and robbery. The single age group with the highest number of male victims was 20 – 24 and these persons were victims of murder. For the females it was rape and carnal abuse. For the

female age group 0 – 9, the crime most committed against them was carnal abuse followed by rape. The age group with the

highest number of carnal abuse victims was the 10 – 14 age group. With respect to rape, the victims were largely in the 15 – 19 age range. The magnitude of this problem may be seen in the fact that the groups in which rape and carnal abuse were most frequently reported were the only groups in which female victimization exceeded that of males (Rape under Jamaican law may only be committed against females therefore all rape victims were females). Male victims of sexual abuse by males are as categorised as victims of buggery or indecent assault.

Although not as high as figures for other age groups, 1% of crime victims for 2006 were in the 0 – 9 age group. In keeping with regulations presented in the Child Care and Protection Act 2004 which seeks to *provide for the care and protection of children and young persons and for connected matters* even 1 victim is unacceptable.

7. Positive Public Safety

The high prevalence of the fear of criminal victimisation among young people, their involvement in criminal activities and a ‘culture of violence’ in communities point to the rise of violent crime and murders as a youth and urban phenomena, which requires specific solutions, i) the issues

causing youth alienation and mal-adjustment to the mainstream, and ii) the disintegration in communities which facilitates the growth of criminal activities.

The discussion above implies that the solution lies not only in law enforcement, but also in a multi-disciplinary approach to crime prevention, that promotes community safety and addresses the root causes of the problems and the everyday manifestations. Such an approach would treat the individual and their communities as part of a complex and interconnected system. The underlying philosophy is to mitigate the risk factors and provide viable opportunities to young people.

It is important that strategies to improve public safety draw on evidence-based practices, proven to reduce criminal victimisation, promote community development and enlance the future of young people. Central to this should be a program of reintegration, which facilitates young people’s assimilation into mainstream society. Of course, this will involve investing resources to create jobs, facilitate the healthy formation of families and emphasise education.

Conclusions

All considered, males were both the primary perpetrators and victims of major crimes. Some suggest²⁷ biological explanations such as the high levels of testosterone produced by males in comparison to females, which are said to predispose them to becoming higher risk takers than females and thereby more susceptible to criminal influences than females. Others point to socio-cultural influences that give males greater exposure to negative influences that eventually lead them into crime.

Undoubtedly, in Jamaica, the impact of gangs and the drug trade exert greater influence on males than females notwithstanding the fact that many females are used as “Drug Mules”. Whatever the reason however, it is clear that greater attention needs to be paid to young males in the formulation of strategy to reduce the levels of crime and violence in particular. There is also the need to develop appropriate responses to the victimisation of females particularly in respect of offences against the person and sexual and domestic violence.

Related Issues and Challenges

Related Issues

Major issues include but are not restricted to:

1. Increases in drug related crimes
2. Large number of organised criminal gangs
3. Use of Jamaica as a transshipment point by narcotics traffickers
4. Proliferation of small arms
5. Poor image of the JCF and general distrust of them
6. Political divisions contributing to crime
7. Drug abuse
8. Human trafficking
9. Existence of extortion rings
10. Involvement of some members of the JCF in criminal activities
11. High level of involvement of youth, in crimes
12. Deportee involvement in crime
13. High level of involvement of males in Crime

²⁷ E.g. Akers

Challenges

1. Mainstreaming communities that are linked to gangs and criminal networks
2. Building trust between JCF and the public at large
3. Depoliticising garrison communities
4. Purging the JCF of corruption
5. Reducing youth involvement in delinquency

Corrections and Rehabilitation

Historical Development

During the post-independence years the prison system in Jamaica was composed of three (3) main entities: the Prisons, the Probation Services and the Approved Schools which functioned separately in the implementation and execution of the correctional functions of the Government.

This distinction of roles in the administrative process created an inefficient system plagued with inconsistencies and duplication. To rectify this problem, in 1975 an administrative directive ordered that the three bodies be joined to form one department. This union led to the formation of the Department of Correctional Services, one of the main facets of the Ministry of

National Security and Justice. Prior to the merger in 1975, the conceptual function of the prison system was that of punishment. However, the merger forged new directions for the Correctional Services as opportunities were opened for rehabilitation and care.

In keeping with this new philosophy on offender management, in 1978 the Criminal Justice Reform Act was passed in Parliament and introduced new alternatives to incarceration (non-custodial sentences). The non-custodial options are:

- I. **Community Service Order (CSO)** – an order to complete at least 40 hours (now being revised) of unpaid work within the community
- II. **Suspended Sentence Supervision Order** – an option where the Court defers the sentence and the offender is given a chance to prove himself in the community.
- III. **Voluntary Supervision** – recommended by the court when the offender is deemed to be in need of counselling or treatment outside of the formal sentencing system
- IV. **Probation Order** – allows the offender a form of community based rehabilitation

In addition to these non-custodial options,

the Department also introduced other rehabilitative mechanisms to assist in the successful re-integration of the individual into society. These include the After-care Programme, Licence, Hostel Placement and Statutory Supervision and Parole (Act passed 1978).

Today, the Department has three (3) core functional areas:

- Custodial Services (Adults and Juveniles)
- Rehabilitation,
- Human Resource Management and Community Services.

These three core areas seek to: provide facilities for admission, incarceration and welfare of inmates and wards; administer the probation, parole and hostel services operating in the community and provide the necessary reports that will assist the Courts to make informed decisions in selected cases; implement rehabilitation programmes for inmates, offenders and wards including educational programmes, individual group counselling, spiritual/religious instruction and other treatment programmes; and develop, implement and evaluate procedures to ensure fiscal responsibility.

Current Situation

The Department of Correctional Services currently has responsibility for seven adult correctional centres, one adult remand/correctional centre, three juvenile correctional centres and one juvenile remand centre.

Community services are provided through 18 probation offices distributed around the island. Sentencing options are of two types, custodial and non-custodial. Other options used by the Correctional services include diversion programmes. These programmes are geared towards persons at risk to prevent them from committing and repeating crimes.

Adult facilities and inmates

The number of individuals admitted to adult correctional institutions has been trending downwards (2,881 in 2006, 2,744 in 2007 and 3,685 in 2008). Notwithstanding these institutions have been operating above their rated capacity for more than five years and in 2008, the population of custodial clients was approximately 27% above the rated capacity of 2900. Of the individual centres, the Tower Street Correctional and St. Catherine Adult Correctional centres have consistently exceeded their capacity by the

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

widest margin (over 98% and 46% respectively in 2008). First time, non-violent offenders with sentence less than two years accounted for approximately 73% of inmates.

There were a total of 2,100 persons admitted to Adult Correctional Centres in 2006. This total figure represents a 22.19% and 8.20%% decline over the same period for 2002 and 2005 respectively. It should be noted however that while there were reductions in the number of admissions from 2005 to 2006, there was an increase in the number of re-offenders from 445 in 2005 to 496 in 2006. In 2008, the number increased to 515.

The reduction in the number of new admissions is consistent with a decrease in the number of major crimes from 7,360 in 2002, 8,275 in 2005 to 7,129 in 2006. If this assumption is true, then it is likely that the number will increase after 2009 given the upsurge in crimes since 2007. Delays in the justice system also have militated against the timely disposal of cases and this has had an impact on the number of persons in Correctional Facilities. In 2006 a total of 624,256 cases were brought forward while an additional 561,466 new cases were filed

in the Resident Magistrates' Court. However, of this number (1,185,722) only 464,252 were disposed of leaving 721 470 (60.85%) in arrears.

Of major concern is the youthful face of the inmate population. In 2006, a total of 1,815 persons in the 12 – 25 age group were arrested on suspicion of committing major crimes. This represented 53.43% of all new admissions. This has been the trend over that last 5 years as in 2002, 55.39% of persons arrested for major crimes were in the 12 – 25 age group and in 2005, 47.45%.

The number of youth being admitted to correctional centres reflects the active participation of youth in criminal activities. In 2006 23.2% of all major crimes were committed by persons in the 12 – 24 age group while, figures for 2002 and 2005 were 22.4% and 19.3% respectively. In addition to being actively involved in committing crimes, a significant number of youth are also the victims of major crimes; 33.65% in 2002, 28.44% in 2005 and 39.54% in 2006.

A second major concern is the fact that approximately 68.0 per cent of those admitted are unskilled and approximately

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

52 per cent, illiterate.

The gender distribution of the population in Correctional Institutions at all levels was heavily skewed towards males. At the end of March 2007, of the 4,888 individuals who were in Remand and Correctional Institutions, over 94% were males compared with just below 6% females (see Table 3). When the data was disaggregated by individuals serving sentences as opposed to those in remand, the results were similar. Just under 95% of inmates serving custodial sentences were males.

The preponderance of males in Correctional Institutions is a reflection of the high level of involvement of males in delinquency and crimes in the wider society when compared to females.

Females serving custodial sentences are housed only in the Fort Augusta Correctional Centre. This institution was built in the early 20th century and has a capacity of 250. At the end of March 2007, the facility housed 199 individuals including 47 juveniles. The juveniles were there because of insufficient space in the single female juvenile correctional centre at Armadale which has a capacity of 45 but was housing

70 at the end of March 2007. (See further discussion in the section on juveniles).

Fort Augusta lacks adequate facilities for reception and screening of new inmates and for hosting visitors. There is also no provision for the placement of inmates according to special needs or risk. While the facility is kept clean, there are no recreational areas and only limited training facilities and juveniles are not kept separate from adults.

Males serving custodial sentences are housed in two maximum security (Tower Street and St. Catherine District) and two minimum security (Tamarind and Richmond Farm) institutions. The maximum security institutions were built in the 19th century while those for minimum security were built in the early 20th century. They are overcrowded and lack decent basic amenities. They also lack adequate facilities for recreation, skills training and for individuals with special needs.

The fact that the physical infrastructure of the two primary custodial institutions are in the main, clusters of old buildings dating back more than 100 years poses challenges to the effectiveness of the functioning of

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

these institutions. They do not reflect modern concepts of care and rehabilitation and offer very poor living conditions. This creates challenges for rehabilitation and control of the population of inmates. This is exacerbated by the high level of overcrowding and the limited capacity to separate inmates by the degree of risk that they pose.

The network of institutions has been challenged by incidents of unrest in which other inmates and wardens have been injured or killed in the male maximum reception centres and female juvenile correctional centres. There have also been minimal levels of escapes at low risk adult and juvenile correctional centres.

In addition, anecdotal and other evidence exists to suggest that contraband activities are common in the correctional centres and inmates, staff and visitors are able to operate illegal schemes involving the outside community. They are able to smuggle contraband goods in and out of the prisons. They are also able to fashion and access dangerous weapons that pose a threat to other inmates and their wardens.

The emphasis on the imposition of non

custodial sentencing and community services for convicted offenders was introduced as an alternative to custodial sentencing and a strategy to reduce overcrowding in correctional services. However, there are challenges to the system for providing supervision of custodial and non-custodial offenders due to the inadequacy in the number of probation officers assigned to institutions (18) and to offices (101).

There are also challenges to the system for dealing with inmates with mental health issues. The 2002 case of a man who had been incarcerated for over forty years for a minor offence without ever having been tried, due to mental health problems, speaks not only to failures in the courts system, but also to the inadequacy of the prison system to monitor and care for such individuals.

Since then guidelines from the Ministry of Justice have required that monthly reviews be undertaken by the psychiatrist and the courts with a view to securing the release of such individuals. However the absence of a forensic psychiatric facility and secure psychiatric units at regional hospitals hamper effective care and rehabilitation of mentally ill persons or offenders who pose a

risk to society (*cross cutting issue for Justice and Health sectors*).

Efforts to modernise the system within the Department of Correctional Services have been hampered by the absence of financing to support physical infrastructure development, staffing and technology improvement. This is yet to be included in government's modernisation agenda. Notwithstanding, the administration has tried to implement reforms such as releasing low risk prisoners for home leave on special occasions and training programmes delivered by individuals, NGOS and faith based organisations (FBOs).

Additionally, they have utilised music therapy as a rehabilitative tool and a pilot broadcasting and recording facility has been established at the Tower Street Correctional Facility. They have also implemented security measures such as the installation of a new tower and closed circuit television in the Tower Street facility, improved the industrial relations strategy and ensured greater accountability and compliance with standard operating procedures.

Many in the population hold the view that

the scarce resources of the country would be better spent supporting more deserving projects since the convicted offenders are paying the price for their crimes. However, sustaining a system that emphasises punishment rather than rehabilitation might be contributing more to the perpetuation of the current rate of recidivism rather than a reduction in the rate of crime. In this regard, the rate of recidivism has averaged more than 25% over the four year period 2003 -2006.

Therefore reform, rehabilitation and renewal of the physical infrastructure and management system to reflect modern concepts of rehabilitation and control seem to be priority areas that are vital to the security of the country.

Juveniles' facilities and inmates

The Juvenile Correctional Centres were housing 470 wards at the end of March 2007. This was approximately 51 per cent above the rated capacity (see Table 2). The distribution of those serving sentences was heavily imbalanced towards males although less skewed than the adult population (approximately 78% males compared with 22% females). In 2008, the number fell to 430 (317 males and 113 females).

facilities are inadequate to house the

Table 2: Ideal capacity and muster for Juvenile and Adult Institutions, March 2007

Institutions	Type	Classification	Ideal Capacity	Muster 18/04/07
Tower Street. Adult Correctional Centre	Male	Max. (Reception)	850	1672
St. Catherine Adult Correctional Centre.	Male	Max. (Reception)	850	1283
South Camp Adult Correctional Centre	Male	Maximum	250	249
Tamarind Farm Adult Correctional Centre	Male	Medium	350	305
Richmond Farm Adult Correctional Centre	Male	Low/Open	300	121
Fort Augusta Adult Correctional Centre	Female	Max. (Reception)	250	152 adults
				47 juveniles
New Broughton Remand Centre.	Male	Low/Open	50	21
Horizon Adult Remand Centre.	Male/Female	Max.	1036	622-adult male
				21-adult females
				34-juvenile mal.
				2-juvenile fem.
St. Andrew Juvenile Remand Centre	Male	Max.	48	46
Hill Top Juvenile Correctional Centre	Male	Max.	98	110
Armadale Juvenile Correctional Centre	Female	Max.	45	70
Rio Cobre Juvenile Remand Centre	Male	Max.	120	133
Total			4247	4888

Source: Data supplied by the Department of Corrections

The figure recorded for March 2007 was an increase over the period ending December 2006 (326). This followed annual increases over the December 2002 – 2006 period (up from 148 in 2002 to 326 in 2006-Table 3). The increasing number of offenders placed in custody highlights the fact that the

population of juvenile delinquents. The result is that some juvenile offenders are housed in adult correctional institutions, especially those that are awaiting court appearances. The single female correctional institution, Armadale, currently houses just under 56 per cent over the rated capacity

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan - Situational Analysis

(Table 2). However, plans are in place to

open a facility in Montpelier, St. James to accommodate 250 male juveniles. This will facilitate the conversion of one of the existing facilities into a female remand centre.

There are also issues concerning the quality of supervision and care given to inmates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that corporal punishment is liberally applied and that modern and humane methods of control and rehabilitation are lacking. As with the adult

Table 3: Juvenile Situation as at March 11, 2007

Institutions	Capacity	Present Muster	Excess
Armadale Juvenile Correctional Centre	45	68	23
Hill Top Juvenile Correctional Centre	98	118	20
Rio Cobre Juvenile Correctional Centre	120	148	28
St. Andrew Juvenile Remand Centre	48	50	2
Fort Augusta Adult Correctional Centre *	0	47	47
Horizon Adult Remand Centre *	0	39	39
TOTAL	311	470	159

Source: Presentation, "Prison Conditions" by Major Richard Reese
Commissioner of Corrections, 20th April 2007

*NB * Fort Augusta Adult Correctional Centre and Horizon Adult Remand Centre are Adult Correctional and Remand Centre respectively*

As with adult institutions, the facilities are not structured to separate high risk and violent offenders from other inmates. This could contribute to juveniles admitted for minor offences or under Care and Protection orders becoming hardened through the influence of more serious offenders.

correctional institutions there is need for greater support for mental health care. Financial constraints have hampered the construction of modern facilities and the implementation of more rehabilitative measures.

Non custodial sentencing options are more




liberally applied with respect to juveniles when compared with adults. In this regard, 729 juveniles received non-custodial


sentences in 2006, more than twice the

Table 4 and related Figures

ADMISSIONS INTO JUVENILE INSTITUTIONS OVER THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD, 2002-2006

YEAR	INSTITUTIONS					Total	Total	
	Armada	Hill Top	Rio Cobre	HARC	FAACC		Male	Female
2002	30	77	41	0	0	148	118	30
2003	28	90	70	0	0	188	160	28
2004	18	46	64	0	0	128	110	18
2005	32	88	74	0	0	194	162	32
2006	52	87	96	42	49	326	225	101





ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Issues

- a. Old dilapidated correctional centres
- b. Severe overcrowding especially in male reception institutions and female juvenile custodial institutions
- c. Inadequate level of staffing (e.g. correctional officers and probation officers)
- d. Absence of facilities for housing of inmates by classification (risk and care)
- e. System and facilities not sufficiently geared to inmate rehabilitation
- f. Links between inmates and criminal gangs still active
- g. Trafficking in Contraband
- h. Incidence of HIV/AIDS in correctional institutions (although declining)
- i. Public perception and attitude to corrections – Punitive vs. Rehabilitative
- j. Unsupportive environment for the return of offenders to community
- k. Inadequate mental health treatment and care
- l. Delay in disposal of cases for persons on remand for periods in excess of two years
- m. Need for education and skills training
- n. Absence of secure, comprehensive hospital facilities

Challenges

- o. Identifying the finances to support the required changes
- p. Gaining the support of all relevant stakeholders for changes required
- q. How to achieve joined-up Justice system especially for coordinated approach to logistical support
- r. How to achieve capacity to meet demand in a timely manner (appeals, parole, remand, trial etc.)

SWOT Analysis

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
Crime and Punishment Citizen's involvement <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Availability of skills (pool of well trained, highly skilled workforce) 2. New supportive legislation (e.g. Proceeds of Crime Act; Fingerprint Act etc. 3. Modernization of Law enforcement Infrastructure 4. New Technologies 5. Collaboration with International Partners 6. Strong supportive, knowledgeable leadership 7. Innovative approaches to 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Availability of resources 2. Police/community relations 3. Investigative techniques 4. Corruption 5. Police discretion 6. Legislative framework inappropriate <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outdated laws • Enforcement of Laws • Lengthy period for enacting legislation • Rules governing the marshalling and treatment of evidence 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New Technologies 2. General Justice Reform 3. Parole System Review 4. Prospect of refocusing goals of punishment/penal institutions in revamping the system 5. Regional security structures 6. Globalization of security interest 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disregard for law and order 2. Poor relationships between citizens and police 3. Easy access to guns/gun culture 4. Transnational organised crime/drug trade 5. New Technologies 6. Urban ghettos 7. Social disorganisation/parallel systems of governance 8. Vigilantism 9. Economic deprivation/social exclusion 10. Breakdown of societal values/lack of consensus on fundamental values 11. neighbourhood structures 12. Poor socialisation

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<p>evidence-based policy making</p> <p>8. Strong effective training programmes/environments for JCF and JDF</p> <p>9. Strong effective training programmes/environments for JCF and JDF</p>	<p>7. Punitive penal system</p> <p>8. Overcrowded correctional and detention centres/institutions</p> <p>9. Response times to reported crime slow</p> <p>10. Inadequate infrastructure</p> <p>11. High rate of recidivism</p> <p>12. Inadequacy of rehabilitation programme</p> <p>13. Training program for new recruits</p> <p>14. Attrition rate</p> <p>15. Recruitment</p> <p>16. Management system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accountability • Supervision <p>17. Preservation of crime scene</p>		<p>13. Sensationalisation of crime in the media</p> <p>14. Population Desensitized to crime and violence</p> <p>15. High incidence of crime</p> <p>16. Corruption</p> <p>17. Distrust of the police</p> <p>18. Unavailability of witnesses</p> <p>19. Uncontrolled access to crime scenes</p> <p>20. Some communities protect offenders</p> <p>21. Extra judicial enforcement</p>

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
BUILT ENVIRONMENTS GARRISONS AND CORRUPTION 1. Local Government Reform (supports governance at community level)	1. Slow pace of Reform	1. Greater awareness of citizens of governance issues	1. Existence of Don's in Garrison and other inner-city communities 2. Some politicians see LGR as a threat to their power base
2. Inner City housing projects (improves conditions of Inner City areas and offers opportunity to select beneficiaries a non-partisan basis)	2. Housing projects relocates residents into same areas	2. Social intervention programmes being implemented by NGOs and other institutions and individuals 3. Large pool of trainable working age population	3. Inadequate support base to complement programme and ensure that it is adequately resourced 4. Inability of beneficiaries to sustain payments for housing 5. Low level of engagement of "uptown communities" with inner-city areas
3. Establishment of Squatter unit in Min. Ag.	3. Inadequate resources to support enforcement and relocation	4. Idle government lands available to support relocation Development of industries in previously rural areas and the development of highways affords opportunities for relocation	6. High level of criminal activities in squatter communities 7. Low level of willingness of persons with high integrity to engage in inner city projects
4. Recently strengthened anti-corruption legislation 5. National Contracts committee very proactive 6. Strong Contractor General and Auditor General	4. Poor enforcement	5. Public demand for accountability & transparency offers opportunity for change	8. Security clearance for contractors easily evaded

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<p>7. Strengthened electoral system</p> <p>8. Strengthened Crime fighting capacity of the Security Forces e.g. Operation Kingfish,</p> <p>9. Introduction of overseas experts for transparency and new ideas</p> <p>10. Current Policy and operating environment encourages and supports the interdiction of formerly “untouchable” criminals such as the “Dons” irrespective of political affiliation</p> <p>11. Political code of conduct established and accepted that requires disassociation from individuals associated with corruption and criminal activities</p>			
<p>ORGANISED AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME</p> <p>1. Some supportive legislation</p>	<p>1. Mainly low- level technology available for use by law enforcement</p>	<p>1. Environment becoming more supportive of</p>	<p>1. Porous borders (inadequate monitoring of coastline and airspace)</p>

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
2. Established institutional framework 3. Cadre of trained personnel 4. Established systems Presence of international experts 5. Strong collaboration with overseas partners who are advanced and well equipped in the fight against organised and international crime	agencies 2. Inadequate range and quantity of equipment available for use by law enforcement agencies 3. Outdated systems and processes in use by Law enforcement agencies 4. Level of human resources inadequate to meet current law enforcement needs 5. Inadequate level of housing available to law enforcement agencies 6. Gaps in existing legislation 7. Image of corruption and abuse within and by the Security forces	collaboration between law enforcement and the public 2. Multiple ‘though uncoordinated interventions involving, NGOs etc. 3. Proposed intelligence sharing mechanism for the Caribbean 4. Efforts from the international community that make resources available to local efforts 5. Free press that is supportive of efforts to eliminate organised crime 6. Improving technology available for use	2. Unstructured (squatter communities) 3. Low level of education among large numbers of youth, especially males 4. High unemployment among youth 5. Confrontational politics still exists 6. Geographic location of Jamaica creates vulnerability to international Narco-trade, smuggling of weapons, human trafficking and smuggling etc. 7. Instability in bordering countries such as Haiti 8. High level of illegal immigrants from places such as Haiti and Honduras 9. High number of youth without parental support or guidance 10. Weak institutional support for street and other vulnerable children 11. International linkages between local Jamaicans and international criminal networks (esp. North America and Europe) 12. Lack of public awareness of rights and responsibilities 13. Corruption in some public agencies 14. Utilisation of improved communications and other

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
			technology by criminal networks 15. Weak enforcement of civil codes
VULNERABLE GROUPS <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Commitment of GOJ and all key stakeholders to addressing the issues. 2. National security Strategic Plan prepared. 3. Existing bonds (though informal) among youth 4. Increased collaboration among CBOs and Government 5. Existence of a large number of social intervention programs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inadequate economic activities and opportunities. 2. Fragmented approach to programme delivery. 3. Gap between pro-programmes and accessibility to vulnerable population. 4. Lack of coordination and articulation between various complementary programmes. 5. Absence of effective monitoring and support programmes. 6. Inadequate focus on early detection of and prevention and root causes. 7. Lack of ownership and inadequate input from the vulnerable in society on the programme contents. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Implementation of literacy programs including use of IT learning software at Jamaica Foundation for life-long learning. 2. Many different organisations operating small social programmes in inner city/vulnerable communities. 3. Willingness of the IDPs to invest in crime reduction programs. 4. Public outcry against crime and violence. 5. To re-train and equip police for community policing activities. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. High level of Illiteracy. 2. Unstable family structure and poor family support. 3. Garrison communities. 4. Rural/urban migration. 5. Feelings of isolation/ hopelessness and despair in the communities. 6. Cultural misconception of some persons who deliver the programmes. 7. Sometimes there is a perceived “uptown/ downtown” divide that hinders service delivery. 8. Easy access to illicit drugs and perceived financial rewards from drug dealing. 9. Easy access to guns. 10. Inadequate level of community policing to provide protection to vulnerable groups. 11. Not enough role models in society.

STRENGTH	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Inadequate long term strategic planning. 9. Urban degradation. 10. Institutional weaknesses. 11. Weak leadership/ implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Implement mentorship programs. 	
<p>COMMUNITY COLLABORATION AND COMMUNITY BASED POLICING</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community based policing is an established policy within the JCF – the policy framework includes a training curriculum and materials within the JCF National Training Academy 2. Community based policing is already operating in some communities where police have engaged business community and youth in positive partnerships. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training to facilitate systemic change is inadequate (this is just being rolled-out in the JCF) 2. Absence of public education 3. Lack of confidentiality among police 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NGOs are in a position to support public education delivery and police/citizen partnerships 2. Growing recognition and acceptance of the need for this approach within communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Attitudes among some community members and members of the JCF do not support this approach 2. Police corruption and the resulting levels of mistrust 3. Organized crime and gangs 4. Physical layout of informal communities impedes the ability of the police to know the community and use community policing approaches

Strategic Vision and Planning Framework for National Security and the Correctional Services

The long-term process of planning for National Security and the Correctional Services is guided by a Vision for each area (National Security and the Correctional Services) that describes a future for the sector that is desirable for its stakeholders and that can be achieved through their own efforts within a realistic time frame. The Vision Statements are as follow:

Vision Statements

National Security:

“A system of National Security that promotes shared values of respect for law and order and guarantees safety, security, human rights and dignity for all.”

Correctional Services:

“A Highly satisfied and trained, professional workforce administering a Correctional Services system that upholds human dignity and facilitates the holistic development and rehabilitation of clients as productive, peaceful and law abiding citizens”

Strategic Plan

Despite the many approaches that have been tried to reduce crime in Jamaica, in particular violent crimes, serious crimes such as murder continue at an alarming rate as seemingly intractable features of the Jamaican society. The Vision 2030 Jamaica sector plan for National Security and Correctional Services seeks to reverse this situation.

The plan recognises that there is no simple solution and that any approach must involve a triangulation of efforts between the government, civil society and the private sector. It takes cognizance of the relationship between crimes and other phenomena. These include: the statistical links between murders and the availability of guns; criminal gang networks and murder; youth, crime and criminal gang networks; the drug trade and the trade in and availability of guns; and communities and the propensity to commit serious crimes. The plan also recognises the link between the effectiveness of the Justice System and the Correctional Services and the propensity of criminals to continue committing criminal acts.

The Goals around which the plan has been built encapsulate sub themes relating to the issues raised in the foregoing. These

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Strategic Vision & Planning Framework

include: empowerment of communities and fostering of community support for equity and the rule of law (Goal 1); strengthening respect for the law and law enforcement agents in the wider society, reducing organised and trans-national crime as well as youth involvement in gangs and criminal enterprise and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement agencies (particularly the JCF) with respect to methods of operation, acquisition and use of appropriate technology and facilities and

integrity (Goal 2); improving the management of Jamaica's borders and territorial waters (Goal 3); and strengthening the process of reintegrating and rehabilitating convicted offenders and at risk individuals in society (Goal 4).

The four (4) main goals and associated outcomes of the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan are presented below.

Goals	Outcomes
1. Social cohesion within and among communities	Partnerships and participation are encouraged in order to prevent crime and ensure public safety
	Communities are empowered to protect and sustain their environments
2. A society that adheres to law and order	There is improved confidence and respect for the police
	Law enforcement services to the public are effective and timely
	The public is served through an effective organisation and leadership structure
2. Protected Jamaican borders and territory	Mechanisms for the defence of Jamaica's sovereign space are strengthened
4. An integrated system that manages reintegration and rehabilitation	An effective and efficient programme for the management and rehabilitation of clients of correctional services
	Promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of deported persons

Sector Indicators and Targets

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Strategic Vision & Planning Framework

The proposed indicators and targets for the Tourism Sector Plan over the period 2009 – 2030 are presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5: National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan – Indicators and Targets

Sector Indicators	Baseline	Targets			Comments
		2012	2015	2030	
1. # of at Risk Communities	18				
2. % of crimes committed by youth					
3. % of murders that are committed with guns	77.4%				
4. % of known gangs dismantled					
5. Cleared Up rate of murders					
6. % of prison population engaged in education and or skills training activities					

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Implementation Framework & Action Plan

Implementation Framework and Action Plan for the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan

Implementation Framework

The implementation of the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan is an essential component of the implementation, monitoring and evaluation framework for the Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan. The Plan is implemented at the sectoral level by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of Government as well as non-state stakeholders including the private sector, NGOs and CBOs. The involvement of stakeholders is fundamental to the successful implementation of the National Development Plan and this Sector Plan.

Accountability for implementation and Coordination

The Cabinet, as the principal body with responsibility for policy and the direction of the Government, has ultimate responsibility for implementation of the National Development Plan. Each ministry and agency will be accountable for implementing the National Development Plan (NDP) through various policies,

Components of Vision 2030 Jamaica

The Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan has three (3) components:

1. Integrated National Development Plan:

The integrated National Development Plan presents the overall plan for Vision 2030 Jamaica, integrating all 31 sector plans into a single comprehensive plan for long-term national development. The integrated National Development Plan presents the National Vision, the four National Goals and fifteen National Outcomes, and the National Strategies required to achieve the national goals and outcomes.

2. Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF):

The Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF), is a 3-yearly plan which summarizes the national priorities and targets for the country and identifies the key actions to achieve those targets over each 3-year period from FY2009/2010 to FY2029/2030.

3. Thirty-one (31) Sector Plans:

At the sectoral level Vision 2030 Jamaica will be implemented through the strategic frameworks and action plans for each sector as contained in the respective sector plans. Vision 2030 Jamaica includes a total of thirty-one (31) sector plans covering the main economic, social, environmental and governance sectors relevant to national development.

programmes and interventions that are aligned with the strategies and actions of the NDP and the sector plans. A robust results-based monitoring and evaluation system will be established to ensure that goals and outcomes of the Plan are achieved. This system will build on existing national and

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Implementation Framework & Action Plan

sectoral monitoring and evaluation frameworks and will be highly participatory.

Resource Allocation for Implementation

Vision 2030 Jamaica places great emphasis on ensuring that resource allocation mechanisms are successfully aligned and integrated with the implementation phase of the National Development Plan and sector plans. The requirements to ensure resource allocation for implementation will include alignment of organizational plans in the public sector, private sector and civil society with the National Development Plan, MTF and sector plans; coherence between the various agency plans with the National Budget; rationalization of the prioritisation process for public sector expenditure; and increased coordination between corporate planners, project managers and financial officers across ministries and agencies.

Action Plan

The Action Plan represents the main framework for the implementation of the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan for Vision 2030 Jamaica. The tracking of implementation of the Sector Plan will take place through the Action Plan as well as the framework of sector indicators and targets.

The Action Plan contains the following

elements:

Sector Goals

Sector Outcomes

Sector Strategies

Sector Actions

Responsible Agencies

Timeframe

ACTION PLAN

Goal 1: Social Cohesion Within and Among Communities

Outcome 1.1: Partnerships and participation are encouraged in order to prevent crime and ensure public safety

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
1.1.1 Improve implementation of targeted community interventions	1. Develop a national crime prevention and community safety strategy	2009 -ongoing	MNS, JCF,CBOs
	2. Develop a governance structure for community safety and security social intervention	As above	
	3. Strengthen capacity for state and non-state actors	As above	
	4. Promote gender equity in community intervention strategies	As above	

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
	5. Include community stakeholders in the development of intervention programmes Build in mechanisms for the continuity and sustainability of intervention programmes	As above As above	
1.1.2 Implement holistic programmes focusing on intervention and suppression of youth involvement in crime	1. Develop a comprehensive youth offender strategy 2. Implement programmes for the prevention of child and youth involvement in crime 3. Work collaboratively with the MOE to formalise and improve safety and security in schools	2009- onwards As above As above	MNS, DCS, JCF, CDA, MCYS
1.1.3 Promote awareness and care for vulnerable groups	1. Strengthen enforcement mechanisms for laws that protect the interest of vulnerable groups	2010	MNS MLSS

Outcome 1.2: Communities are empowered to protect and sustain their environments

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
1.2.1 Establish/Strengthen community groups/councils	1. Support establishment of a community management apparatus for each community island-wide 2. Develop awareness campaigns aimed at deterring involvement in illicit or coercive governance arrangements	2009 – ongoing As above	MNS, NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, JCF MNS,
1.2.2 Develop programmes to mobilise and draw on societal support for safer communities	1. Engage media bodies in partnerships for public sensitisation 2. Support establishment of a peace-building machinery to provide victim support and enable further intervention	As above 2010 onwards	MNS, JIS, Various media houses, private sector

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
1.2.3 Improve community conformity to legal requirements	1. Enhance capacity of regulatory and enforcement bodies to monitor public order issues	2010 – 2013	MNS, Regulatory bodies
	2. Establish channels of communication between public good providers and essential service ministries	2009 -2010	MNS, CBOs, FBOs, NGOs
	3. Institutionalise involvement of the Ministry of National Security in community planning	2009-2010	MNS, Local Government
	4. Regularise or dismantle informal settlements	2010 - 2030	Authorities, OPM

Goal 2: A Society that Adheres to Law and Order

Outcome 2.1: There is improved confidence in and respect for the police

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
2.1.1 Modernise approach for policing activities	1. Adopt and implement the recommendations of the 2008 JCF Strategic Review	2009 - 2015	MNS
2.1.2 Facilitate a culture of integrity and ethical behaviour within law enforcement (police, JDF, customs and PICA ²⁸) agencies	1. Define and propagate proper ethics, values and attributes throughout all law enforcement bodies	2009	MNS
	2. Re-launch brand and image of law enforcement agencies where appropriate	2010 onwards	MNS, JIS, Media Houses
	4. Develop and implement an anti-corruption policy in all law enforcement agencies	2009 -2010	MNS

²⁸ Passport Immigration and Citizenship Authority

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
2.1.3 Strengthen accountability frameworks within law enforcement (police, JDF, customs and PICA) agencies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review acts and regulations of agencies to ensure enforcement of internal accountability 2. Review security vetting processes in keeping with global best practices 3. Upgrade security standards and inspection protocols for key government institutions 4. Strengthen capacity of oversight bodies for law enforcement agencies 5. Strengthen sanctioning systems for breaches in professional behaviour 6. Incorporate views of citizens in determining local law enforcement priorities and strategies 		

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
2.1.4 Roll out community based policing programme in all communities island-wide	1. Develop institutional framework to implement and monitor programme 2. Train relevant law enforcement personnel in appropriate policing techniques		

Outcome 2.2: Law enforcement services to the public are effective and timely

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
2.2.1 Improve the quality of services provided by law enforcement (police, JDF, customs and PICA) agencies	1. Improve the environment of points of contact with the public to reflect customer service ethos 2. Develop and implement customer service policies for all law enforcement bodies (citizens' charter) 3. Enhance the capacity to deter and investigate sophisticated crimes 4. Promote intelligence-driven approach to criminal investigations		
2.2.2 Adequately equip law enforcement (police, JDF, customs and PICA) agencies to deliver a timely service	1. Review equipment procurement processes for modification where necessary 2. Acquire suitable weaponry and transportation to complement standard and tactical response activities 3. Strengthen enforcement of maintenance policies for law enforcement physical resources		
2.2.3 Increase access to policing services	1. Rationalise the placement of police services to ensure adequate coverage		

	2. Enhance the capacity of the police to provide victim support at the scene of the crime		
2.2.4 Improve communication and information technology infrastructure	1. Rationalise communication processes to ensure effective dissemination to internal and external stakeholders for all agencies 2. Compile an ICT strategic plan to guide technology acquisition 3. Ensure secured lines for electronic communication within each law enforcement agency 4. Improve and integrate MIS systems throughout the law enforcement apparatus and with regulatory agencies within both the public and private sectors		
2.2.5 Reinforce adequacy of regulatory framework for private security firms	1. Strengthen enforcement capacity of Private Security Regulation Authority 2. Establish policy governing interactions between private security officers and agents of law enforcement		

Outcome 2.3: The public is served through an effective organisational and leadership structure

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
2.3.1 Devise and implement an effective management framework aligned to modern models of law enforcement	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Promote an intelligence-driven culture in law enforcement2. Undertake leadership training programme for senior level staff on an ongoing basis3. Complete implementation of recommendations from the 2006 JDF Strategic Review4. Separate decision making and management structures within agencies5. Develop and implement an incentive-based, performance management and appraisal systems for law enforcement bodies6. Conduct a comprehensive rank and compensation review for relevant law enforcement bodies		

2.3.2 Create a comprehensive human resources development system to ensure professionalism within law enforcement (police, JDF, customs and PICA) agencies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish executive-level, civilian human resource departments for all law enforcement agencies 2. Update recruit selection procedures to keep in line with global best practices and ethos of respective agencies 3. Revamp training programmes to reflect global best practices and ethos of respective agencies 4. Define clear paths for career development and succession planning 		
2.3.3 Develop a holistic approach to the welfare of law enforcement (police, JDF, customs and PICA) officers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop and implement a Health and Safety Policy for all law enforcement agencies where none is present 2. Establish an Occupational Health and Safety Unit within major law enforcement agencies 		
2.3.4 Scale up process of civilianisation throughout armed forces	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conduct comprehensive staff audit for law enforcement agencies 2. Devolve non-core functions to appropriate civilian units and bodies 		

Goal 3: Protected Jamaican borders and territory

Outcome 3.1: Mechanisms for Defence of Jamaica's Sovereign Space are Strengthened

STRATEGIES	SPECIFICATIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
3.1.1 Strengthen security mechanisms at ports of entry	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Review Port Security legislation2. Develop Border Control Policy to address all border security matters3. Install metal detectors, X-ray machines at all official ports of entry4. Implement a tracking system for all cargo through a localized hub	2009/10 – 2012/13	MNS, Airports Authority, Port Authority

STRATEGIES	SPECIFICATIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
63.1.2 Improve institutional capacity to monitor marine and aerial domains	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Acquire and install equipment capable of detecting and identifying aircraft and vessels within Jamaica's airspace and maritime area on a 24 hour basis2. Clearly establish protocols governing offshore security responsibility3. Increase number of JDF and Marine Police outstations around our coastline4. Equip JDF and Marine Police with the adequate number of air and surface assets to adequately monitor and respond to activities in Jamaica's territory		

STRATEGIES	SPECIFICATIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
3.1.3 Ensure a coordinated national response to threats of terrorism	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies to respond to terrorist threats 2. Increase intelligence capacity to specifically address terrorist issues 3. Collaborate with ODPEM and MOH in developing comprehensive anti-terrorism contingency plans 		
3.1.4 Advance regulatory framework for non-citizens	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amend legislation to facilitate biometric requirements for visas 2. Introduce advanced passenger and pre-clearance systems for all air ports 3. Establish formal system for management of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants 4. Strengthen institutional capacity for policing tourist areas 		

STRATEGIES	SPECIFICATIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
3.1.5 Fortify collaboration with regional partners and international bodies	<div>1. Develop protocols with partner nations to deal with common issues of the illicit trades of weapons, ammunition and narcotics, human trafficking and refugee control</div> <div>2. Maintain a cadre of trained personnel for overseas deployment</div> <div>3. Utilise regional systems such as the Regional Clearance System to bolster Jamaica’s intelligence apparatus</div>		

Goal 4: An integrated system that manages reintegration and rehabilitation

Outcome 4.1: An effective and efficient programme for the management and rehabilitation of clients of correctional services

STRATEGIES	SPECIFICATIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
4.1.1 Expand framework for rehabilitation of custodial and non custodial clients	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Introduce new programmes for the rehabilitation of offenders in accordance with global good practices 2. Distinguish rehabilitation programmes with respect to age and gender of clients 3. Develop an accreditation strategy for all rehabilitation programmes with an educational component 		
4.1.2 Strengthen the institutional capacity of the DCS and its partners	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improve the physical and technological capacity of the DCS to monitor both custodial and non-custodial clients 		
4.1.3 Provide suitable alternatives to incarceration for mentally ill clients where appropriate	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collaborate with the Ministry of Health in developing modern protocols for the care of mentally ill clients 2. Support efforts to reduce the stigma of mental illness in the society 		

Outcome 4.2: Promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of deported persons

STRATEGIES	SPECIFIC ACTIONS	TIMEFRAME	RESPONSIBILITY
4.2.1 Establish a comprehensive system through partnership between state and non-state actors for the rehabilitation and reintegration of deported persons	<div>1. Strengthen private-public partnerships for the provision of support to deportees</div> <div>2. Establish appropriate processes and accommodations for the reception of deported persons</div> <div>3. Develop an action plan to reduce re-offending centred around employment and training</div>		

Monitoring & Evaluation Framework for the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan

Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Institutional Arrangements

A number of institutions and agencies, including the following, will be involved in the monitoring and evaluation framework for the National Development Plan and the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan:

Parliament: The Vision 2030 Jamaica Annual Progress Report will be presented to the Parliament for deliberations and discussion.

The Economic Development Committee (EDC) is a committee of Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister. The EDC will review progress and emerging policy implications on the implementation of Vision 2030 Jamaica and the relevant sector plans.

The National Planning Council (NPC) is a consultative and advisory body which brings together top decision-makers in the Government, private sector, labour and civil society. It is proposed that the NPC accommodates discussion on the Plan at least once every quarter as a national consultative forum on the implementation of Vision 2030 Jamaica.

The Vision 2030 Jamaica Technical Monitoring Committee (TMC), or Steering Committee, is to be chaired by the Office of the Prime Minister and will provide oversight for the technical coordination and monitoring of the Plan and reporting on the progress of implementation.

The Vision 2030 Jamaica Technical Secretariat to be institutionalized within the PIOJ will play a leading role in coordinating implementation, analyzing social and economic data and information, consolidating sectoral information into comprehensive reports on Vision 2030 Jamaica's achievements and results, maintaining liaisons with sectoral focal points in MDAs, and

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Monitoring & Evaluation Framework

supporting the establishment and operation of Thematic Working Groups. Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) represent very important bodies within the implementation, monitoring and evaluation system. They are the Sectoral Focal Points that will provide data/information on a timely basis on the selected sector indicators and action plans, and be responsible for the timely preparation of sector reports that will feed into the Vision 2030 Jamaica Annual Progress Report. For this Sector Plan, the main MDAs comprising the relevant Sectoral Focal Point will be the Ministry of National Security and its various connected agencies and institutions such as the JCF, DCS and PICA.

Thematic Working Groups are consultative bodies aimed at providing multi-stakeholder participation in improving the coordination, planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects relevant to the NDP and sector plans, including the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan.

TWGs will be chaired by Permanent Secretaries or senior Government officials and shall comprise technical representatives of MDAs, National Focal Points, the private sector, Civil Society Organizations and International Development Partners. TWGs will meet a minimum of twice annually.

Indicator Framework and Data Sources

Appropriate indicators are the basic building blocks of monitoring and evaluation systems. A series of results-based monitoring policy matrices will be used to monitor and track progress towards achieving the targets for the NDP and sector plans, including the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan. The performance monitoring and evaluation framework will be heavily dependent on line/sector ministries for quality and timely sectoral data and monitoring progress.

The results-based performance matrices at the national and sector levels comprise:

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Monitoring & Evaluation Framework

- At the national level, 60 proposed indicators aligned to the 15 National Outcomes
- At the sector level, a range of proposed indicators aligned to the sector goals and outcomes
- Baseline values for 2007 or the most recent past year
- Targets which outline the proposed values for the national and sector indicators for the years 2012, 2015 and 2030
- Data sources which identify the MDAs or institutions that are primarily responsible for the collection of data to measure and report on national and sector indicators
- Sources of targets
- Links to existing local and international monitoring frameworks such as the MDGs

Some gaps still exist within the performance matrix and a process of review to validate the proposed indicators and targets is being undertaken. This process is very technical and time consuming and

requires significant cooperation and support from stakeholders and partners.

The performance monitoring and evaluation framework will be heavily dependent on ministries for quality and timely sectoral data and monitoring progress. The system will benefit from our existing and relatively large and reliable statistical databases within the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) and the PIOJ.

Reporting

The timely preparation and submission of progress reports and other monitoring and evaluation outputs form an integral part of the monitoring process.

The main reports/outputs of the performance monitoring system are listed below.

1. **The Vision 2030 Jamaica Annual Progress Report** will be the main output of the performance monitoring and evaluation system.
2. **The annual sectoral reports** compiled by the Sectoral Focal Points for submission to the Vision

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – Monitoring & Evaluation Framework

<p>2030 Jamaica Technical Monitoring Committee. These will be integrated into the Annual Progress Report.</p> <p>3. Other products of the performance monitoring system include issues/sector briefs and research reports.</p>	<p>calls for substantial resources, partnership and long-term commitment to training MDA staff. Training needs will have to be identified at all levels of the system; a reorientation of work processes, instruments, procedures and systems development will have to be undertaken; and staffing and institutional arrangements will need to be put in place. Partnership with the Management Institute for National Development (MIND) and other institutions will also be required to provide training in critical areas such as results-based project management and analysis, monitoring and evaluation, and data management to public sector staff and others.</p>
---	---

Capacity Development

There is recognition that building and strengthening technical and institutional capacity for the effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NDP and the National Security and Correctional Services Sector Plan is critical for success. This

List of Acronyms

CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSI	Community Security Initiative
DCS	Department of Corrections
EDC	Economic Development Council
ISCF	Island Special Constabulary Force
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF	Jamaica Defense Force
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIND	Management Institute for National Development
MTF	Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework
NCVS	The National Crime and Victimization Study
NDP	National Development Plan
NPC	National Planning Council
NSDT	Non-Secure Drug Treatment Program
PICA	Passport, Immigration and Naturalization Agency
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
STATIN	Statistical Institute of Jamaica
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TMC	Technical Monitoring Committee
TWG	Thematic Working Group

References

Barnes, A et al. A study on criminal deportation, The Ministry of National Security and the Planning Institute of Jamaica. , Kingston 2006

Buscaglia, E and van Dijk, J, Controlling Organised Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector, Forum on Crime and Society, Volume 3, Numbers 1 and 3. 2003

Charles, C (2004) Political Identity and Criminal Violence in Jamaica: The Garrison Community of August Town and the 2002 Election, Social and Economic Studies, Volume 53, No. 2, pp. 31 – 73.

Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean (March 2007). A Joint Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region

Deflem, Mathieu.. Review of ‘A Theory About Control,’ by Jack P. Gibbs. Contemporary Sociology 25(4):571-572, 1996

Figueroa, M and Sives, A (2003) Garrison Politics and Criminality in Jamaica: Does that 1997 Election Represent a Turning Point in Harriot, A . ed (2003)

Gray, Sherrian. *The Case of Kingston, Jamaica*

Harriott, Anthony () Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy, UWI Press: Kingston, 2004

Jensen, Gary F. 2003. Social Disorganization Theory. Encyclopaedia of Criminology. Richard A. Wright (Editor). Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers

National Security & Correctional Services Sector Plan – References

Naím, M (2007) The Hidden Pandemic: How crime is quietly becoming a global killer. *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2007

Naím, M (2001) Meet the World's Top Cop, *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb; Kyle, D and Koslowski, R (2001) *Global Smuggling*, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore

Naím, M (2003) The Five Wars of Globalisation, *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb

Naím, M (2005) Smuggling: The Threat to Global Trade, *Newsweek*, Oct.

Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica, 1996 - 2008*

Shaw, M., van Dijk, J., and Rhomberg, Wolfgang (2003). Determining Trends in Global Crime and Justice: An Overview of Results from United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, *Forum on Crime and Society*, Vol. 3, Numbers 1 and 2.

The Sunday Gleaner, November 17, 2002

Wilson, J and Kelling, G (1982), The Police and Neighbourhood Safety – Broken Windows

APPENDIX 1

List of Members for the National Security Task Force

Mr. Gilbert Scott	-	Permanent Secretary
Lt. Colonel Khan	-	Senior Director, Strategic Planning, MNS
Ms. Patricia Balls	-	Director for Community Security Initiative, OPM
ACP Novelette Grant	-	Director, Corporate Strategy, Planning, Research
Mr. Daniel Wilson	-	Executive Director - SDC
Mr. Mark Myers	-	President, Chamber of Commerce
Admiral Hardley Lewin	-	Chief of Staff, Jamaica Defence Force
Dr. Elizabeth Ward	-	Director, Disease Prevention & Control, MOH/VPA
Dr. Anthony Harriot	-	Department of Government, UWI
Mr. Daniel Wilson	-	Acting Executive Director, SDC
Ms. Patrice Donald	-	Centre for Gender and Development Studies, UWI
Bishop Herro Blair	-	PMI
Mr. Horace Levy	-	UWI
Mrs. Annmarie Barnes	-	Deputy PS – MNS - Chair
Mr. Simeon Robinson	-	Director – Citizens Security and Justice Programme
Mr. Peter Parchment	-	Strategic Planner – MOJ
Mr. George Briggs	-	Chief Technical Director- Cabinet Office
Mrs. Beverly Lopez	-	PSOJ - Co-Chair
Rev. Adinhair Jones	–	Executive Director: National Youth Service
Mr. Harold Crooks	-	JASPEV Technical Working Group – c/o JUTC
Mr. Oscar Spencer	-	Deputy Representative: IADB
Ms. Karen Turner	-	Representative – USAID
Mrs. Annmarie Ali	-	Deputy Resident Rep.: UNDP
Dr. Lloyd Barnett	-	Jamaica Council for Human Rights
Ms. Sheila Nicholson	-	Executive Director, Peoples Action for Community Transformation

APPENDIX 2

List of Members for the Correctional Services Task Force

Major Richard Reese	-	Commissioner - Chair
Ms. Laura Plunkett	-	Director - Planning Research & Evaluation
Pastor Everette Brown	-	Central Jamaica Conference of SDA – Co-Chair
Mr. Eric Douglas	-	Boards of Visitors
Father Kenneth Richards	-	Board of Visitors
Mr. Gile Campbell	-	Director – Rehabilitation
Ms. Maureen Jones	-	Stella Maris Church
Mr. Wayne Denny	-	Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights
Justice Averil McKain	-	Parole Board
Ms. Sandra Ramsay	-	Food for the Poor
Mrs. Joy Walker-Edwards	-	United Church in Jamaica & the Cayman Island
Mrs. Mary Clarke	-	OCA
Ms. Bula Grizzel	-	Former Staff of Hibiscus
Dr. Donavon Thomas	-	Executive Director, Jamaica Youth for Christ